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Executive Summary 
This  document  is  the  deliverable  D2.2.2  “Public  report  on  Grid  infrastructure  interoperability 
challenges” of the EU IST-2002-511438 SIMDAT project. The document provides an analysis of 
key  Grid-related  interoperability  specifications,  with  a  view  to  defining  an  adoption  policy  for 
industrial Grid developments.  
The  document  outlines  the  key  challenges  confronting  specifications  initiations  and  vendors 
wanting  to  develop  compliant  infrastructure  technologies.  Each  specification  is  then  described, 
along with the benefits and considerations associated with their adoption. Following the analysis, 
Industrial  Grid  Profile  recommendations  are  defined  that  will  be  implemented  in  successive 
SIMDAT developments.  
WS-Addressing provides a standard way to encode context identifiers, and it is proposed that this be 
done for all SIMDAT services.  However, WS-Addressing also allows a sender to induce a recipient 
to  transmit  a  (signed)  message  to  a  third  party,  and  to  include  SOAP  headers  of  the  sender’s 
choosing  under  the  signature  of  the  intermediary.    This  is  unacceptable  in  an  industrial  Grid 
environment, and it is proposed that SIMDAT should recognise WS-Addressing specifications for 
constructing  and  addressing  messages  only  for  a  white-list  of  address  and  context  identifier 
elements. 
WSRF uses WS-Addressing to carry context identifiers for specific server-side resources known as 
WS-Resources, and specifies an XML document encoding of properties of these resources, plus get, 
set and query operations on a WS-Resource.  These are used to publish WS-ResourceLifetime data, 
which also supports scheduled or immediate WS-Resource destruction.  Finally, WS-ServiceGroup 
provides a way to create collections of service endpoints characterised by their resource properties, 
and to search these collections using resource property queries. 
Adoption  of  resource  properties  requires  security  considerations:  some  properties  should  have 
restricted  access,  but  the  access  operations  select  which  properties  are  returned  based  on  input 
arguments (query terms), meaning the security policy must be aware of the semantics of resource 
properties and query languages.  Unless security infrastructure exists to is addressed these concerns 
(e.g. by an argument-aware and query language-aware security infrastructure), it is hard to use 
WSRF except in a limited way.    WS-ResourceLifetime could be adopted but without exposing the 
lifetime properties (unless they are the only properties of the WS-Resource), but WS-ServiceGroup 
should not be adopted. 
WS-Notification (WSN) defines a collection of interfaces for transmitting notification messages 
directly between a producer and a consumer using push- or pull-style transfer, plus a specification 
for distribution of these messages through a broker, and for defining topics that allow subscribers to 
select particular notifications of interest.  These specifications use WS-ResourceProperties, and so 
depend  on  how  resource  properties  are  secured,  although  only  optional  parts  of  the  WSN 
specifications have this dependency.  The main adoption consideration with WSN defining and 
enforcing  access  policies  for  notification  subscription  and  message  distribution,  to  prevent 
unauthorised  access  to  information  through  notifications,  and  possible  misuse  of  notification 
producers for denial of service attacks. 
Finally,  OGSA WSRF Profile 1.0 provides a normative profile for implementing Grid services 
using WSRF and WSN, mandating the use of WS-ResourceProperties and WSN in a wide range of 
situations.    The  security  policy  considerations  with  WS-ResourceProperties  and  WSN  must  be 
solved for this to make sense in an industrial context.  SIMDAT should therefore aim for basic 
conformance  to  WSRF  initially,  and  later  WSN,  using  conservative  security  policies  for  WS-IST -2004-511438 SIMDAT – D2.2.2 Public-1.0  5 of  37 
ResourceProperties  and  notification  subscription.    Each  release  of  the  SIMDAT  Grid  Solution 
Portfolio will be accompanied by an industrial Grid profile and an explanation of how why that 
profile was chosen. IST -2004-511438 SIMDAT – D2.2.2 Public-1.0  7 of  37 
and  Grid  communities.  We  then  provide  an  analysis  of  key  Grid-related  interoperability 
specifications including:  
￿  WS-Addressing [
1], which describes the encapsulation and use of a (possibly contextualised) 
Web Service address via End Point References (EPR); 
￿  the  WSRF  [
2]  collection  of  specifications,  which  describes  a  particular  use  of  WS-
Addressing to access resources via contextualised Web Services; 
￿  the WSN [
3] collection of specifications, which builds further on WSRF to define patterns 
for transmitting notifications between Web Services; 
￿  the OGSA WSRF profile [
4], which defines normative functionality expected of an OGSA-
compliant Grid, building on WSRF and WSN.  
The purpose is to understand how these specifications can be used in industrial, B2B scenarios 
where infrastructure that can support strict but flexible export policies is critical. Each specification 
is  described,  along  with  the  capabilities  and  adoption  considerations.    Following  the  analysis, 
Industrial  Grid  Profile  recommendations  are  defined  that  will  be  implemented  in  successive 
SIMDAT developments.  
The  analysis  provided  in  this  document  incorporates  conclusions  resulting  from  NextGRID 
experiments including security issues with WS-Addressing, and scalability considerations with WS-
ServiceGroup .  In SIMDAT, we have widened the analysis to include a set of specifications that 
are considered important to industrial Grids, specifically examining the security, operational and 
dynamic (semantic) requirements of industrial applications. 
                                                 
1 WS-Addressing, http://www.w3.org/Submission/ws-addressing/ 
2 WSRF 1.2 specification, http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=wsrf 
3 WS-Notification, http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=wsn 
4 OGSA WSRF Profile, http://www.ggf.org/documents/GFD.72.pdf IST -2004-511438 SIMDAT – D2.2.2 Public-1.0  9 of  37 
isn’t  possible.  To  overcome  this,  the  leading  middleware  vendors  formed  a  group  called  WS-
Interoperability [
11], which defines so-called “profiles” – constrained  ways to use Web Service 
standards.  For example, WS-I Basic Profile 1.0 [
12] specifies that only certain transport protocols 
should  be  used  (even  though  WSDL  can  accommodate  others),  so  that  vendors  don’t  have  to 
implement all possible protocols in their frameworks.  It also specifies that complex types should be 
represented in WSDL and SOAP messages using XML Schema, so implementers can provide only 
one mechanism for converting such types to and from messages, etc. The WS-I Basic Profile 1.0 
and WS-I Basic Security Profile are now the de facto specifications for developing Web Services.  
In addition to these core profiles defined by WS-I, Web Service standards have been proposed to 
support higher-level services such as trust, federation, state, management, notification, orchestration 
(workflow), etc. Most are still being discussed at W3C and OASIS.  The explosion, conflict and 
complexity of the specifications, makes interoperability a difficult target for most vendors. 
The  most  significant  battle  has  been  to  standardise  the  protocols  for  resources,  events  and 
management. The Globus Alliance with IBM and others launched a new collection of standards 
called the “Web Services Resource Framework” (WS-RF) in 2004, part of which (concerned with 
notification) was later decoupled to become “WS-Notification”.  These proposals were made to 
OASIS, built on existing and emerging Web Service standards, and were seen as a key step that 
allows convergence between Web Services and the Grid by supporting applications that require 
services  to  support  stateful  long-running  activities.  However,  although  WSRF  was  ratified  by 
OASIS in Spring 2006 and is compatible with wider Web Services standards (and their likely future 
development), it was somewhat controversial. Key vendors, Sun and Microsoft, did not back the 
proposals  and  went  another  direction.  Sun  launched  the  Web  Services  Composite  Application 
Framework  (WS-CAF)  [
13]  which  included  WS-Context  (WS-CTX)  for  providing  a  common 
mechanism for managing and sharing context information between Web Services, whilst Microsoft 
adopted  a  similar,  but  lightweight  approach  to  WSRF,  submitting  different  specifications  WS-
Transfer and WS-Eventing specifications to the W3C. 
The split between the different factions made developing and standardising higher-level application 
services very challenging. Vendors have to understand the specifications in detail to decide how 
they  support  application  requirements  but  importantly  they  need  to  make  a  judgement  of  the 
longevity of each initiative. For example, groups working on the OGSA [
14] are defining a set of 
specifications profiles for Web Service protocols to support Grid capabilities such as execution 
management,  data  transfer,  etc.  The  profiles  are  largely  based  on  WSRF,  however,  there  are 
exceptions. For example, OGSA-BES [
15] does not mandate an underlying resource specification 
and tries to support both WSRF and WS-I implementations of job services. Building these higher-
level application specifications on such a fragile foundation makes interoperability of application 
level services through standards compliance almost impossible. 
Fortunately, the major vendors (HP, Intel, Microsoft, IBM) realised that the dispute needed to be 
resolved for the greater good and published the WS-Convergence white paper detailing a roadmap 
                                                 
11 WS-I, http://www.ws-i.org/ 
12 WS-Basic Profile, http://www.ws-i.org/deliverables/workinggroup.aspx?wg=basicprofile 
13 WS-CAF, http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?wg_abbrev=ws-caf 
14 OGSA, http://www.globus.org/ogsa/ 
15 OGSA-BES, https://forge.gridforum.org/projects/ogsa-bes-wg/ IST -2004-511438 SIMDAT – D2.2.2 Public-1.0  10 of  37 
for converging these specifications over the next 24-36 months (2006 – 2009) [
16]. All four vendors 
promise to deliver products that support these specifications and IBM commits to influence the 
OASIS WSRF technical committee to refactor the WSRF specifications into extensions that build 
on WS-ResourceTransfer and the OASIS WS-N technical committee. The white paper does not 
include Sun and WS-CTX looks likely to fade away.  
The  road  map  consists  of  three  sections  covering  resources,  events  and  management.  Figure  1 
shows how the existing specifications stack from OASIS and W3C/DTMF will be converged. WS-
Transfer and WS-Enumeration is proposed as the base for resource management whilst two new 
specifications, WS-Transfer Addendum and WS-ResourceTransfer, are proposed. In summary: 
￿  WS-Transfer  Addendum  will  extend  WS-Transfer  to  add  support  for  WS-Addressing 
endpoint references 
￿  WS-MetadataExchange  v1.1  will  build  on  WS-Transfer  and  WS-Transfer  Addendum  in 
place of its current domain-specific protocol 
￿  WS-ResourceTransfer builds on WS-Transfer, WS-Transfer Addendum, WS-Enumeration, 
and  WS-MetadataExchange,  providing  sophisticated  resource  management  capabilities 
comparable to those of WSRF 
 
 
Figure 1: WS-Convergence of resource, events and management specifications 
The  event  processing  roadmap  proposes  using  WS-Eventing  for  event  processing.  A  new 
specification  called  WS-EventNotification  has  been  proposed  that  integrates  many  of  the  WS-
Notification  capabilities.  WS-EventNotification  builds  on  WS-ResourceTransfer  to  support 
resource management of subscriptions. The management roadmap proposes the development of a 
                                                 
16  “Toward  Converging  Web  Service  Standards  for  Resources,  Events,  and  Management”  http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-
us/dnwebsrv/html/convergence.asp?frame=true IST -2004-511438 SIMDAT – D2.2.2 Public-1.0  12 of  37 
Many  of  the  challenges  for  cost  effective,  secure  and  robust  collaborative  working  using  Grid 
technologies are still a matter of research even though early adopters within industry are exploring 
the potential of the technology within their business. The instability of the management layer, a key 
infrastructure capability for inter-domain collaborations, will cause vendors to base medium term 
developments on existing commitments to specifications such as WSRF or WS-Transfer. They are 
unlikely to commit to implementing further interoperability specifications such as WSDM when 
they will be superseded over the next couple of years by WS-Convergence. The current business 
value  proposition  for  interoperability  is  not  viable  for  most  Grid  vendors  who  do  not  want  to 
compromise  technological  advances  to  achieve  it,  considering  the  level  of  instability  with  the 
current specifications.  
Interoperability  requires  stable  standards  and  specifications:  Many  different  communities  are 
working to solve the challenges of large-scale distributed computing (ebXML, OGF, W3C, etc). 
Each community is creating proposals that address similar capabilities (trust, security, management, 
orchestration)  which  results  in  standards  that  evolve  and  will  continue  to  evolve  very  rapidly. 
Hitting such a moving target is a difficult task for vendors trying to use these standards to achieve 
interoperability between applications and processes. True compliance and interoperability testing 
can only be achieved when a standard has reached stability. In the face of immature standards a 
vendor should track the changes, focus on their customer requirements rather than interoperability 
and implement solutions in the spirit of leading approaches.  
Beware  of  competing  proposals  from  major  vendors:  When  vendors  come  together  to  create 
implementations that embrace the spirit of open specifications and the correct business drivers exist, 
interoperability  initiatives  can  be  successful.  Where  there  are  conflicts  between  major  vendors 
adopting specifications can be very risky and may result in expense re-factoring efforts. We see 
examples such as the emergence of BPEL from XLang and WSFL and now the WS-Convergence 
initiative. In such situations, there is usually a compromise allowing each group to demonstrate how 
earlier initiatives contribute to the new specification(s). In most cases, competing specifications 
from major vendors can be considered immature rather than de-facto standards. The likelihood of 
achieving interoperability based on competing specifications is limited. Adoption should be based 
on using a specification to meet the needs of customer requirements rather than interoperability. 
Know the limits of largely academic initiatives: The centre of power in the standards space is with 
the major software vendors. The influence academic initiatives can have on new standards is limited 
because of the influence these large vendors have on the overall IT market is very large. Academic 
initiatives can contribute to the overall progress but these contributions are largely observed by 
commercial  vendors  rather  than  embraced  within  software  products.  GGF  (now  OGF)  was  a 
specifications  organisation  working  on  supporting  the  distributed  computing  needs  of  the  Grid 
community, largely contributed to by academic organisations. However, few interoperable systems 
exist today and significant events over the last few years have demonstrated the limits of GGF’s 
power.  The initial OGSA/OGSI proposals in 2003 [
19] were not accepted by the wider Web Service 
community and now WSRF will be superseded through commercial vendors actions. The fact that 
GGF achieved ratification of WSRF by OASIS was an excellent achievement but, although some 
concepts will remain, the specification is now not considered the solution. The alliance between 
EGA  and  GGF  to  create  OGF  does  bring  in  more  commercial  interests  into  the  specifications 
process but we should wait to see the levels of engagement from commercial vendors and of course 
only history will judge if specifications developed are successful. 
                                                 
19 “A developer's overview of OGSI and OGSI-based grid computing” http://www-128.ibm.com/developerworks/grid/library/gr-ogsi/ IST -2004-511438 SIMDAT – D2.2.2 Public-1.0  14 of  37 
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Figure 3: Malicious use of WS-Addressing 
Several solutions were proposed, but the one adopted in the Candidate Recommendation of Aug’05 
simply mandated that a WS-Addressing type attribute be used to indicate header elements generated 
from  an  EPR,  and  that  the  “must  understand”  attribute  never  be  set  for  such  headers.    The 
specification also allows a service to refuse to process an EPR fully if it is not satisfied that to do so 
would  be  safe.    For  example,  the  specification  suggests  that  this  might  be  determined  by 
authenticating the issuer of the EPR, and processing it only if it comes from a trusted source. 
Finally, note that WS-Addressing only forces services to construct a response from an EPR when it 
is included in a WS-Addressing ReplyTo or FaultTo header element.  EPR can also be conveyed to 
or from a service by other means, in which case the recipient may (but is not required) to use them 
for contextualised addressing of responses or subsequent messages as though they were sent in the 
WS-Addressing headers.  In practice, this is how WS-Addressing is most often used in Grids.  Of 
course, it doesn’t matter how the EPR is transmitted, the problems described here arise whenever an 
EPR is used to generate context headers for an outgoing signed SOAP message. 
Analysis by the NextGRID project has shown that the solution from the August 2005 specification 
is not satisfactory.  Firstly, allowing recipients to ignore WS-Addressing obligations at will means 
the specification cannot guarantee interoperability.  Furthermore, the above attack using reference 
parameters can also be committed using Address elements in an EPR.  For example, the address for 
C in Figure 2 could be set (by A) to “https://yourbank.com/debit?amount=14”, causing B to send a 
message that achieves the same effect.  A may even be able to gain access to protected information 
by specifying C=“http://yourbank.com”, causing B to send a message to C without transport-layer 
security. 
Unfortunately, signing over messages and headers does not really solve the problem.  If A signs its 
message to B, this would allow B to tell it came from A, including the ReplyTo header.  B may then 
decide  to  go  ahead  and  construct  a  response  as  specified  by  A’s  ReplyTo  header,  converting 
reference parameters into full SOAP header elements and sending the resulting message to C.  Only 
B can then bind this header to the message by signing over it, so C can only tell that the response 
came from B.  C cannot tell if B understood the header elements, nor who originally specified them.  
Thus B’s signature can no longer be taken to mean B intended the meaning implied by all parts of 
its message, but only that B constructed the message to C, including some headers specified by a 
third party whose identity cannot be verified by C. 
If C wanted to know which headers B really did understand, B could insert more attributes, but this 
is not specified by WS-Addressing so interoperability could no longer be guaranteed.  B could 
insert a second message-level signature covering only the headers it inserted, but this would conflict 
with the WS-Interoperability Basic Security Profile, which says there should only be one signature 
to identify the sender of a message.  (Multiple signatures would in any case create a semantic 
interoperability problem, as applications would have to decide the meaning of each signature).  B 
could of course apply a single signature covering only the headers it originated or understands.  IST -2004-511438 SIMDAT – D2.2.2 Public-1.0  18 of  37 
￿  the request comes from an application that is maintained together with the WS-Resource, so 
that changes in resource properties can be handled by changing the application. 
Fundamentally, service providers should not change syntax and semantics of resource properties 
that have been published to clients unless these changes can be encapsulated. Note that the second 
criterion is not met if the application and the WS-Resource are written by the same organisation, 
since different deploying organisations are unlikely to upgrade at the same instant.  The application 
must normally also be deployed by the same organisation as the WS-Resource.  In effect, this 
means WS-ResourceProperties should only be accessed by the service provider hosting the WS-
Resource. 
The specification does not exclude concurrent access to a resource properties document.  The 
specification  points  out  that  it  may  be  necessary  to  define  transactional  characteristics  for 
concurrent  access,  but  does  not  say  how  this  should  be  done.    This  means  that  a  requesting 
application  must  be  aware  of  the  semantics  and  representation  of  the  properties  of  a  resource, 
including any mechanisms for resolving concurrent access conflicts, in order to use and set resource 
properties correctly. This is important for all Web Services that have multiple operations updating 
stateful resources, however, existing Web Service specifications work on the principle of “stateless” 
interactions whereas WSRF is explicitly stateful and should address transaction concerns. 
Access control restrictions for resource properties are undefined. If any of the stored attributes of 
a WS-Resource are subject to access control restrictions, then the security mechanisms to enforce 
this must also understand the semantics and representation of the properties, and possibly also of 
any query language used to retrieve them. Since all resource properties are accessed via the same 
WSDL operations the security infrastructure must take into account all elements of the request to 
work out which properties were being requested before deciding whether the request is authorised. 
No implementations exist to achieve this in a service-independent way.  The only simple way to 
support different access constraints for each resource property is to support only the mandatory 
GetResourceProperty  operation,  so  applications  cannot  insert  or  change  the  values  of  resource 
properties, and so that the target of each request is unique and easily extracted from the request 
document.    Other  WS-ResourceProperties  access  methods  cause  complications,  and  the  most 
general QueryResourceProperties method, which can process arbitrary queries, is the most difficult 
to deal with. As no general infrastructure policy implementations exist for this operation it can only 
be secured by applying the policy in the method implementation either through a database view or 
by filtering the result set after the query has been executed 
To address the encapsulation and access control problems identified above in a simple way, the use 
of WS-ResourceProperties must be constrained.  There are three basic options: 
￿  specify that the “conversational” resources can have no resource properties, so that all the 
methods return faults in all cases; 
￿  allow  access  to  the  mandatory  GetResourceProperty  method  of  WS-ResourceProperties 
only, with a fixed set of “well-known” properties for each WS-Resource, and an access 
policy for each property; or 
￿  restrict access to WS-ResourceProperties to the host provider of the  WS-Resource, thus 
containing any interoperability problems, and allowing a simple, uniform security policy for 
all resource properties and access methods. 
The first of these options is the simplest, but also the most restrictive as it precludes the use of other 
specifications  that  build  on  the  wider  WS-ResourceProperties.    The  second  option  works  by 
preventing resource property insertions (so that a fixed access policy for well-known properties can IST -2004-511438 SIMDAT – D2.2.2 Public-1.0  20 of  37 
properties of a WS-Resource. 
Read-only access rights 
defined per property. 
WS-ResourceLifetime could be adopted in full. 
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WS-ResourceLifetime does not support the full resource lifecycle. The WS-ResourceLifetime is 
also said to support resource lifecycles, but this is not so.  It only provides a set of destruction 
mechanisms,  and  a  way  of  obtaining  the  (approximate)  scheduled  termination  time.    Some 
“custom” WSDL methods will usually be needed to support other lifetime events such as WS-
Resource creation. 
3.2.5  WS-ServiceGroup 
The  WS-ServiceGroup  specification  defines  a  Web  Service  that  maintains  heterogeneous 
information  about  a  collection  of  WS-Resources.  The  main  use  of  WS-ServiceGroup  is  the 
implementation of a soft-state registry of Web Services, in which WS-Resources can also register 
their resource properties.  A summary of service group concepts are given below:  
￿  ServiceGroup  (identified  by  a  ServiceGroupEPR)  is  a  WS-Resource  that  aggregates 
information  through  resource  properties  operations  from  a  collection  of  member  Web 
Services, that themselves can be WS-Resources; 
￿  ServiceGroupEntry is a WS-Resource describing the association of a member Web Service 
(identified by a MemberEPR) with a Service Group; 
￿  ServiceGroupEPR  is  an  EPR  referring  to  the  ServiceGroup  to  which  the  member  Web 
Service belongs; 
￿  MemberEPR is an EPR referring to the member Web Service itself; 
￿  Content  contains  elements  describing  the  membership  of  the  Web  Service  in  the 
ServiceGroup. 
If the member Web Service is itself a WS-Resource, the Content resource property may include an 
RPDoc child element quoting the resource property document of the member service.  Note that in 
this  case,  the  contents  of  the  RPDoc  child  element  should  track  any  changes  in  the  member 
service’s resource property document.  
The WS-Resource providing access to a ServiceGroupEntry must provide access to its properties.  
It  should  also  support  WS-ResourceLifetime  (allowing  the  destruction  of  ServiceGroup 
membership  associations)  and  the  NotificationProducer  interface  from  the  WS-BaseNotification 
specification with a WS-Topic for notifying changes in the Content resource property. 
The ServiceGroup provides resource properties describing the group and its members: 
￿  MembershipContentRule: specifies as attributes the list of interfaces that must be supported 
by members of the ServiceGroup, and a list of XML Schema global element declarations 
that must be present in the Content resource property of the ServiceGroupEntry for each 
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could be leaked to an unauthorised party via notification.  It also makes the NotificationProducer 
potentially  exploitable  as  a  denial  of  service  agent,  by  subscribing  to  receive  very  frequent 
notifications, and providing the DoS target’s EPR instead of a legitimate consumer.  Since the 
notification messages do not have a response, and need not even be wrapped in a Notify message 
giving the originator’s EPR, the target would be unable to tell the NotificationProducer that its 
notification messages are not welcome. 
Given this, the current WS-BaseNotification specification is dangerous.  It is clearly necessary to 
restrict access to the Subscribe function of a NotificationProducer, but defining a policy for this is 
non-trivial, since: 
￿  all  subscription  attempts  go  via  the  same  WSDL  operation,  so  it  is  not  possible  to 
discriminate via simply defined and enforced constraints on access to this operation; 
￿  the information revealed in notifications depends on the (potentially complex and optional) 
filter argument – the interface doesn’t use a simple identification of subscription topics; 
￿  the destination may not be acceptable to the NotificationProducer, even if the Subscriber 
were accepted – e.g. they may have been induced to specify a consumer EPR provided by a 
malicious third party. 
It is also difficult to enforce a suitable policy, even if one could be defined.  Any enforcer would 
have to inspect the whole subscription request, and decode the implications of a request (including 
the filter) in order to determine whether access should be granted.  This means the policy could not 
reasonably be  enforced  by  a service-independent security layer, but would have to be (at least 
partially) encoded by the specific NotificationProducer implementer. 
The only simple constraint that could easily be implemented is to insist that subscriptions can only 
be established, and notifications only be delivered to services hosted by the same provider as the 
NotificationProducer.  If this constraint is imposed, it would also be possible to adopt a similar 
constraint on the use of WS-ResourceProperties, allowing all WS-BaseNotification functionality to 
be used within the service provider environment. 
3.3.3  WS-BrokeredNotification 
The Web Services Brokered Notification 1.3 specification builds on WS-BaseNotification to define 
an  intermediate  notification  broker  that  acts  as  both  a  NotificationProducer  and  a 
NotificationConsumer.    The  idea  is  that  the  NotificationBroker  subscribes  (as  a  consumer)  to 
notifications from other producers, and accepts (as a producer) subscriptions from other consumers 
to which it distributes the notifications it receives.  This provides two main benefits: 
￿  it improves scalability: if N consumers want to receive notifications from P producers, the 
NP direct interactions between them can be replaced by N + P interactions with the broker; 
￿  it allows notification topics to be organised into hierarchies by the broker, making it easier 
to subscribe to complex subsets of the notification messages produced. 
WS-BrokeredNotification  is  intended  to  support  enterprise-scale  notification  messaging  using  a 
“publish-subscribe” pattern similar to that found in other technologies such as JMS [
20]. 
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￿  the Anonymous Channel profile  for use in “safe” environments such as secure LANs; and 
￿  the Secure Channel profile for use in “unsafe” environments such as the Intranet. 
The only significant difference between the two is that the Anonymous Channel does not require 
mutual  authentication  between  message  senders  and  recipients,  on  the  basis  that  this  could  be 
provided safely by other means in a LAN or Intragrid environment.  We therefore focus on the 
Secure Channel profile, while noting that in some circumstances the Anonymous Channel profile 
may be relevant. 
The profile specifies the following conformance criteria: 
￿  transport security (HTTP or non-HTTP transport using TLS) is mandatory, as defined in the 
WS-I Basic Security Profile, and must use mutual authentication; 
￿  message-level security is optional, but if used must include both signature and encryption as 
defined in the WS-I Basic Security Profile, and incorporate an X509 certificate (or other 
authentication token) in the security header; 
￿  any endpoint using message-level security must include its encryption key within a meta-
data element in its WS-Addressing Endpoint reference; 
￿  other  assertions  may  be  made  by  a  message  sender  by  attaching  security  tokens  to  the 
message, which must be either X509 attribute certificates or SAML tokens. 
Nothing  in  the  Basic  Security  Profile  discusses  authorisation,  except  to  note  that  authorisation 
depends on authenticated identity and other assertions conveyed in security tokens. 
3.4.3  Adoption Considerations 
WS-Notification depends on the adoption policy for WS-ResourceProperties. OGSA WSRF Basic 
Profile  requires  exposure  of  resource  properties  via  GetMultipleResourceProperties  as  well  as 
GetResourceProperty  methods,  and  recommends  that  QueryResourceProperties  with  XPath  1.0 
queries  should  be  supported  as  well.    To  do  this  safely  would  require  a  security  policy  and 
enforcement mechanism that recognises the semantics of resource properties and query language. 
The  introspection  properties  required  by  the  Basic  Profile  do  not  cause  any  new  problems  in 
themselves.    If  the  resource  properties  are  read  only,  then  they  will  be  the  same  for  all  WS-
Resources accessible via a given service, and so cannot be considered security critical.  If a user has 
any access to a WS-Resource, it is reasonable that they can read these introspection properties.  This 
could be enforced, but only by adopting the “per property” security policy. 
OGSA  Basic  Security  Profile  does  not  consider  access  policies  for  resource  properties  and 
notification  messages.    It  confines  itself  to  defining  how  transport  and  message  level  security 
should  be  implemented,  and  does  not  consider  what  access  policy  should  apply  to  resource 
properties or notification messages mandated by the OGSA WSRF Basic Profile. 
OGSA Basic Security Profile also defines a rather “non-standard” mechanism for key exchange, 
encoding keys into EPR, rather than using profiles on existing specifications such as WS-Policy, 
WS-Trust or WS-SecureConversation.  The apparent requirement to use encryption and signature 
together or not at all in message-level security is also odd, since the profile mandates authenticated 
transport-level security, and encryption at both transport- and message level represents a significant 
overhead that is only needed if transporting confidential data via an intermediary. IST -2004-511438 SIMDAT – D2.2.2 Public-1.0  37 of  37 
￿  If we restrict access to GetResourceProperty only, then a single Qname would be the query 
argument in each request, and the set of available resource properties will be fixed.  Could 
we support authorisation policies easily in that case?  If so, how much OGSA functionality 
could be implemented securely with this restriction in place? 
￿  Can we identify a fixed set of non-sensitive resource properties and notification topics that is 
sufficient to implement OGSA?  If so, does it make sense to specify a profile that only uses 
these? Does this make sense if we assume that any other resource properties or topics are 
inaccessible to any but the service provider? 
￿  If we allow free access to all WS-ResourceProperties operations, which OGSA WSRF Basic 
Profile features would become dangerous or unacceptable to industrial users? 
￿  Given any reasonable security policy with respect to resource properties, can we infer the 
security policy that should apply to WSN components and topics required by OGSA? 
What is clear is that we should not adopt OGSA WSRF Basic Profile at present.  To do so may be 
possible  following  wider  testing  and  discussion  of  OGSA  WSRF  Basic  Profile,  leading  to 
consensus on how to handle the security concerns through changes to the profile or identification of 
appropriate and realisable security policies for OGSA functionality. 
5  Conclusions 
In this document we have presented an analysis of key emerging Grid-related specifications and 
adoption considerations in the context of industrial, B2B applications. We have described a strategy 
for incrementally defining an Industrial Grid Profile that constrains the specifications, so that they 
can be safely adopted by industry considering security requirements, operational requirements and 
the stability of current drafts. The publication of Industrial Grid Profiles will enable SIMDAT to 
engage and influence the future development of these specifications.  
The  first  Industrial  Grid  Profile  to  be  implemented  and  justified  was  the  basic  WSRF  profile 
described in Section 4.2. This profile has been implemented in GRIA 5 and has been validated by 
SIMDAT application activities during the Interoperability Phase of the project.  
The second Industrial Grid Profile to be implemented would be the Extended Profile described in 
Section 4.3. This is probably the first for which we could make a reasonable comparison with the 
OGSA profile, though the analysis would have to be revisited with reference to the then current 
OGSA draft and changes as a result of WS-Convergence.  The concern with OGSA at this stage is 
clearly the security policy and enforcement challenge of making a very wide range of properties 
accessible through a single mechanism in an industrial context.  We would have to fully understand 
this security problem before making recommendations to industry and the OGSA working group. 
Clearly,  the  specifications  will  carry  on  changing  rapidly,  as  OGSA  develops  its  architectural 
vision. We will continue to monitor and analysis these amendments feeding back to the SIMDAT 
consortium on adoption options for industrial Grid deployments. 
 